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Promoting Cognitive Complexity Among Violent Extremist
Youth in Northern Pakistan
Abstract
This article reports on the results of an intervention to promote cognitive complexity
(measured by integrative complexity, IC) and perspective taking for youth detained for
violent extremism at the Sabaoon Center for Deradicalization and Rehabilitation in
northern Pakistan. Participants are sixty-four males (mean age 19.77, SD = 3.26)
comprising three cohorts: CVE Detained, CVE Reintegrated, and PVE At-risk.
The Sabaoon IC intervention consists of eight sessions with action learning contextualized
according to an assessment of the push, pull and personal factors that shape the life
experience of the youth. Pre and post testing results show significant gain in IC in the
overall sample (Cohen’s d= -1.80, 95% CI[-.87,-.49]), and in each cohort, indicating
significantly increased ability to perceive validity in one’s own changing views and others’
differing views along with reduction in derogating or dehumanizing outgroups. Oral
presentations showed expected IC scores showing differentiation, with the Reintegrated
cohort showing higher order integrations and expressed confidence to be change-makers in
their communities.
Two subscales from the Violent Extremist Beliefs Survey (concerning beliefs about interreligious harmony and risk-taking behaviors) showed expected changes, but self-report
perspective taking and empathy measures were insignificant.
Limitations: The entire Sabaoon sample was selected for the intervention, and due to time
and operational constraints, it was not feasible to recruit a control group matched on
important variables.
Implications for using IC measurement and method for detained and at risk populations are
discussed.
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Introduction
Policymakers continue to search for evidence-based intervention
strategies that can safely reduce the risk of violence and radicalization
for youth involved in violent extremism. Yet, according to a
comprehensive review of the scientific literature on radicalization into
violent extremism, many studies in the field lack systematic analysis.1
In line with the review authors’ recommendations, this article examines
three independent variables: Push (structural, sociological) factors, pull
(social psychological motivation) factors, and personal (physical,
mental health) factors. The review authors stress the importance of
analyzing how these factors interact to understand the dynamics in
each context. In our analysis of youth involved in violent extremism in
northern Pakistan, push, pull, and personal factors seem to be
intensified by the rote educational method in Pakistan that focuses
thinking on a single right answer, with pervasive cultural impact.
Based on this assessment, psychologists from Pakistan and the United
Kingdom developed a countering violent extremism (CVE) intervention
for a post militant insurgency context. The intervention aim was to
promote more cognitively complex thinking concerning the push, pull,
and personal factors that shaped participants’ life experience. The
intervention was delivered at the Sabaoon Deradicalization and
Reintegration Centre in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, northern
Pakistan to participants with the mean age of 19.7 years. The
intervention’s efficacy was assessed using the concept of cognitive
complexity, measured by integrative complexity (IC), a cross-culturally
validated measure that is predictive of behavioral outcomes concerning
whether intergroup conflict and violence will increase or decrease.2

Overview of Article
In this article, we first outline the recent history of the Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency in northern Pakistan. Second, we
discuss push factors, pull factors and personal vulnerability factors.
How these interact is understood, as mentioned, in terms of their
intensification due to the pervasive rote educational method
throughout Pakistan that focuses on a single right answer. The
resulting black and white thinking style is observed in deficits in basic
reasoning skills and absence of critical, complex thinking among the
Sabaoon youths, which made them easy prey for recruitment into TTP
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violent extremism. We go on to explain how the interaction of these
factors informed the themes of the CVE intervention.3
Next, we provide some theoretical background on how cognitive factors
such as cognitive complexity, meta-awareness and perspective taking
can promote deradicalization and rehabilitation. We explain how these
are outworked in the structure of the intervention concerning
intervention themes relevant to push, pull and personal factors.
We then describe how the Sabaoon team piloted and trained facilitators
to deliver the intervention to detained and reintegrated militants, along
with an at-risk cohort, at the Sabaoon Deradicalization and
Rehabilitation Centre. The aims of the intervention are first to enable
the Sabaoon youths to emerge from cognitive radicalization. This, we
argue, is marked by the low complex, black and white thinking of
extremist ideology. The second aim is to support realistic, cognitively
complex goal-direction to sustain their rehabilitation. We hypothesized
that integrative complexity and perspective taking scores will increase,
post intervention. Our results are followed by a discussion of how these
results compare to other IC interventions, and how the intervention
worked in the context of the overall Sabaoon program. We explore what
broader lessons can apply to CVE efforts elsewhere. And finally, we
discuss the limitations and future directions of this work to sustain
rehabilitation in the face of the Taliban takeover of neighboring
Afghanistan and increased activity by ISIS-K.4

Northern Pakistan Recent History
Pakistan’s Swat Valley in KP province in northern Pakistan has suffered
from violent extremism for years. This is due to Pakistan’s proximity to
volatile regions of Afghanistan with shared Pashtun ethnicity and
cultural values. These cross-border loyalties underpin the following
chain of events, summarized below.
Throughout the 1980s, Afghan mujahideen fighters countered the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan against the odds, helped by United
States armaments and financial support. The Pashtun Taliban emerged
in 1994 to become key players in the Afghanistan Civil War.5 The
subsequent Taliban takeover and repressive rule of Afghanistan (19962001) is well known. In response to the 9/11 attacks in New York by Al Qaida, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization led coalition sought to
destroy al-Qaida training camps hosted in Afghanistan, beginning in
2001. These attacks sparked another refugee flow of mainly destitute
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Afghan women and children who fled to Pashtun tribal areas of
northern Pakistan. Male refugee children, with few options in Pakistan,
were placed in madrassas run by radical Pakistani clerics. From this
chain of events a new generation of Taliban militants emerged, infused
with religious and radical elements quite different from the traditional
culture of Afghanistan.6
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan began activity in 2002 in cross border
tribal Pashtun areas. The group is an amalgam of disparate extremist
groups, and is distinct from, although inspired by, the Taliban.7
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan dramatically increased their activity in
Swat Valley, northern Pakistan, as the war on Afghanistan progressed.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s anti-Pakistan, anti-foreign presence
agenda was able to ride on shared Pashtun loyalties in Swat Valley
where young people identified themselves firstly as Pashtuns
sympathetic to Afghans under foreign attack, rather than as citizens of
a distant Pakistan. This perception was exacerbated by Swat belonging
to the North West Frontier Province until that was changed to KP
province, becoming part of Pakistan’s Federally Assisted Tribal
Authorities. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency of 20072009 effectively took control of Swat Valley, imposing its violent
regime in the name of Sharia, destroying 170 schools, preventing girls
from being educated, enacting public punishments and executions, and
posing a serious threat to the integrity of the nation of Pakistan.
Following the Pakistan Army’s counter-insurgency operation in 2009,
overt TTP control lessened, but their ideological influence within Swat
Valley continued via its leading figures operating from Afghanistan’s
border provinces.8 Some of the most shocking attacks in Pakistan’s
history, including the assault on a school that killed 132 children in
2014 and the shooting of Malala Yousafzai in 2012 were directly
attributed to the (former) TTP leader Maulana Fazlullah. Fazlullah was
killed by security forces and TTP leadership weakened.9 Islamic State
(IS) also attempted to gain a foothold in northern Pakistan from its
Afghanistan base established in 2015, and some Taliban splinter groups
began rebranding themselves as Islamic State to access resources and
training. It is thought that over 200 Pakistanis joined the IS fighters in
Syria over the last decade. During the period of this study, the
fragmentation of extremist factions in Pakistan and Afghanistan
continued, as the terrorist attack on the eve of the Afghanistan Eid
ceasefire in July 2020 shows. At the time of writing, the complete
withdrawal of United States forces at the end of August 2021 has led to
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a rapid Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, now declared the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. The potential for this new chapter of upheaval
to affect the home region of this study’s reintegrated participants is
explored in Next Steps section at the end of this article.

Context for the Intervention
The context for this study is the Sabaoon Centre for Deradicalizations
and Reintegration. Sabaoon, which in Urdu means ‘first light of dawn,’
was established by the Pakistan Army in the Malakand region of
Northern Pakistan in 2009. It is the only the deradicalization and
rehabilitation center for young males from the Swat Valley region
under the age of 18 at the time of their capture by the Pakistan Army,
for involvement in TTP militancy in Pakistan.
The Army appointed a team of civil society clinical and social
psychologists, headed by a neuro-psychologist, to develop and
implement the Sabaoon program.10 Since 2009, the Sabaoon team has
assessed 241 ex-militant youth, of which 236 have been successfully
rehabilitated and reintegrated to the wider community. There has been
only one case of recidivism (0.4%) in the twelve years since Sabaoon
was founded.11
Those inducted to Sabaoon revealed a diversity of needs and
backgrounds, with some as young as 12 years old. Sabaoon’s Mental
Health Team (MHT) in collaboration with supervising psychologists
assessed the youths through taking their personal histories and
narratives, followed by psychometric assessment, academic
assessment, family narrative, and medical examination, which provided
insight into the push, pull, and personal factors discussed below.
Push Factors
Structural, sociological push factors for this study’s participants are
shaped by the upheaval connected to the TTP insurgency and regional
under-development. The Sabaoon team of psychologists found through
clinical interviews the following social conditions contributed to this
sample’s susceptibility to recruitment by TTP. Lack of employment in
the local region meant that fathers often worked abroad in Middle East
countries for years at a time, leaving these youths unsupervised and
with little parental input. Many inductees were middle sons of large
Swati families; 60 percent had over 6 siblings, and 22 percent had 9 or
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more siblings. As middle sons of large families, they were less likely to
remain in school. Such families could ill afford additional sons’ school
fees or the loss of earnings from middle sons taking on menial tasks.
The average school drop-out rate is 72 percent by age 14, and many of
the young males recruited by the TTP had already dropped out of
school or had never attended school.12 The youths had few employment
options in the underdeveloped region and thus few attainable life goals.
TTP recruiters easily filled a gap in the youths’ lives by promising them
a meal, a job, and a cause.
The team observed that Sabaoon graduate youths who maintained goal
direction despite continuing structural factors in the region had the
best outcomes post reintegration. Over the past twelve years, the
Sabaoon team has made it possible for reintegrated youths to pursue
their chosen educational or employment goals through practical and
financial support. At the same time, the team thought it necessary for
realistic decision making and family negotiation skills concerning job,
marriage, and educational goals to be included in the intervention
assessed in this article, to avoid these goals being derailed.
Pull Factors
Pull factors such as psychological motivations, community norms, and
social attitudes contributed to these youths’ vulnerability to violent
extremism. These include negative perceptions of Pakistan state
authorities, particularly police and security forces, which are perceived
to support the “other”, such as other nations, the nation of Pakistan,
other religions, or other sects within Islam. The young men often
expressed having poor relationships with authority figures, including
fathers who as described above often worked abroad. For some of the
adolescents, taking an oppositional stance against so called foreign
Pakistan state authorities felt empowering, providing a counterbalance
to these youths’ oft reported sense of hopelessness concerning their
futures.
As well, in Swat valley towns and villages, a tight sense of
communalism prevails. This is often associated with mistrust and the
fear of the other, and is intensified by geographic isolation between
villages in KP’s mountainous, Himalayan terrain.13 Extensive research
shows that a tight sense of communalism is among key cultural risk
factors correlating with the frequency and severity of violent extremism
attacks in a range of cultural contexts.14 A tight sense of communalism
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is related to low tolerance for difference, and a justification for strong
punishments against deviation from cultural norms.
This norm of strong punishments is illustrated by fieldwork that the
team undertook to identify culturally appropriate media to use in the
intervention. The team gathered twenty-five examples of Swat folklore,
proverbs, and traditional stories from villages in KP. Yet, all these
stories had violence and punishment as a major theme, particularly
against women who are depicted as untrustworthy and untruthful. To
avoid reinforcing socialization impacts that might discourage trust,
exploration, and independent thinking, these locally sourced materials
were excluded. Instead, well known Pakistani cartoon film clips were
selected to introduce session themes in a light touch, humorous way, to
avoid provoking threat or reactance.
Another pull factor according to experimental research is that
individuals who are fused with their group, as can occur in tight
communalism contexts, are found to be more willing to sacrifice
themselves for the group.15 The Sabaoon team found that the youths
felt they had to submit their personal goals to family or community
expectations. In some cases, among Sabaoon detainees, family
members and authority figures within the community played a role in
encouraging the youth towards militancy, cohering with the norm of
subsuming, or sacrificing one’s life for the group.
The Sabaoon team discovered that the youths recruited by TTP were
assigned new names by the militants. This new identity had the effect
of detaching the individual from his former identity and family ties,
becoming a part of a larger collective and a greater cause. Loss of
former self-identity while immersing in a new group identity is
associated with lack of personal agency, conformity to the group and
obedience to authority.16 The lure of belonging to a powerful group
combined with the promise of blissful ease and even higher status in
the afterlife. Overall, the Sabaoon team found that belonging was
observed to be a more important for these youths than the tenets of the
ideology per se. This is a finding in accordance with research showing
that commitment to extremist ideology usually develops after
committing to violent extremism.17
We incorporated these pull factors into the intervention themes and
role play activities to promote agency and an ability to balance the
individual’s values and goals with those of the family and cultural
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group. We developed activities to differentiate proportionate
punishments for social norm breaking from those that are
disproportionate. Unpacking young men’s sense of hopelessness about
local political corruption and its impact on their life chances involved
activities to open the possibility of voting and involvement in local
politics. This was explored based on objective rather than subjective
criteria such as voting according to family and tribe loyalties. We
explored science and traditional beliefs to open themes concerning
fatalism, a belief that one’s destiny and life events are predetermined by
forces beyond one’s control. These activities aimed to support
discovering middle positions between extremes of inflated agency
versus having no agency. A theme of male dominance was indirectly
addressed by including group activities that promoted the welfare of
and equal opportunities for females.18 And, as individuals who are
socialized to give up their personal goals in conformity to the group can
have a greater tendency to compete with outgroups, and given the
turbulence and trauma of the TTP insurgency, we designed two
sessions around role played conflicts in which injustice is perpetuated
toward the ingroup, using randomly assigned fictionalized groups to
safely elicit overt ingroup and outgroup conflict dynamics.19
Personal Factors
Youths with a record of truancy, dropping out of school or running
away from home also showed trends of impulsivity, anxiety, insecurity,
and aggressive impulses.20 As well, the team found a higher-thannormal frequency of neurological abnormalities, measured by
electroencephalogram (EEG) and other neuropsychological tests,
arising from head trauma such as obstetric/neo-natal trauma,
untreated fevers in childhood, poor nutrition, and/or beatings by TTP.
These indicate a range of early and sustained deprivations in the lives
of these young people, with possible subsequent impacts on reasoning
skills.21
We devised activities to provide emotion management skills in the
intervention to calm anxiety, fear, and impulsivity to allow for more
balanced reasoning. We included practical, sensory, and action-based
activities to engage participants’ varied learning styles to support
reasoning skills. Below, we argue how push, pull, and personal factors
were intensified by the singular rote method of education across
Pakistan and Swat Valley schools impacting the how of thinking.
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Push, Pull, and Personal Factors Intensified by Rote
Education
Rote education in Pakistan schools affects every subject taught in
school. Learning is based on rote repetition and memorization, and
impacts those with abundant or little formal education. In addition,
young people are socialized by their elders to see their social world as
they are told to see it, in a binary, right/wrong manner. In answer to
any question, a single right answer is assumed to exist. The Sabaoon
team found that the youths often have anxiety about giving teachers or
authority figures the wrong answer. Thinking can be a search for the
teacher’s expected answer, and proceeds mainly at the concrete level.
The ability to apply higher level abstract principles to new contexts, as
required by contextual reasoning or independent, critical thinking, is
mainly out of reach. Below, we argue that rote education in this cultural
context intensifies and integrates the push, pull, and personal factors
described so far.
Sabaoon youths’ way of thinking about the structural pull factors in
their lives was in black and white terms, as a victim oppressed by the
other, as a member of the good ingroup versus the bad outgroup, or as
helpless in the grip of fate. Pull factors, such as the need for belonging
and identity, involved black and white group categorizations of
inclusion or exclusion, monocausal assumptions about blame, agency,
outcomes, with categorical rules governing behavior without exception.
Achievement means giving the expected answer to teacher or
authorities. As argued above, the rote educational method prevailing in
Pakistan tends to creates a climate of certainty through the expectation
that there is a single right answer to any question.22
The combined effect is described as follows, “cultural systems that have
a strong emphasis on certainty create a strong press for coherence
which results in a collapse of complexity—or more simplistic Black–
White thinking.”23 The authors of this research acknowledge that a
collectivist, communal culture is not a direct cause of low complexity
thinking. Instead, collectivist, communal culture may be a moderator
variable if other factors such as rote education and limited life chances
are strongly present. This accords with our analysis of rote education as
intensifying and integrating push, pull, and personal factors.
As part of clinical interviews, the Sabaoon team assessed the inductees’
reasoning abilities using the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM). The
SPM is a culture free nonverbal assessment of individuals’ logical
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reasoning abilities, and includes the ability to make meaning out of
confusion, and to formulate new concepts when faced with novel
information.24 The team found that over 90 percent of the Sabaoon
population were below the bottom 25th percentile on reasoning skills in
comparison with the SPM’s international database. As well, the team
analyzed verbal data from clinical interviews across four contrasting
individual cases from low to high academic achievers. Each case was
analyzed for integrative complexity (IC), a measure of cognitive
complexity.25 All four cases showed low IC scores26 indicating a low
complex, black and white structure of thinking, regardless of academic
or intellectual ability. Ideas were either right or wrong, people were
either good or bad, outcomes of actions were certain, with little inbetween. Given that the youths already thought about their social world
in black and white terms, it was easy for TTP to shift them to a
purportedly more empowering but equally black and white extremist
ideology. This lack of ability to critically examine arguments meant that
the Sabaoon youth were easily persuaded by TTP that they were
fighting foreign forces in the nation of Pakistan, as decreed by the
Qur’an, despite the lack of Qur’anic evidence for this.
In a similar vein, researchers Gambetta and Hertog found that
university graduates with engineering and science degrees in Middle
East and North African contexts show unexpectedly high participation
in violent extremism despite their extensive education.27 According to
the study’s authors, this was explained at least in part by teaching
methods geared to finding a single right answer which reinforces a
tendency, even among university graduates, towards low complex,
black and white thinking, which is also a linguistic feature of extremist
ideologies generally.28 The Sabaoon team similarly observed that most
male students in the Swat region are expected to take up sciences
rather than liberal arts, reinforcing the quest for a single right answer
even among the highly educated.
In short, the Sabaoon youth seemed less able to think critically or
complexly, regardless of their academic ability or years in formal
education. They were less able to question or perceive other
perspectives, intensifying the impact of the other limiting factors in
their lives. They were unable to see through the black and white TTP
ideology which presented an empathetic face towards Swatis’ ingroup
while denouncing their outgroups – a binary strategy pitting ‘us against
them’ that is widely used by violent extremist groups.29
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So far, we have described how the push, pull, and personal factors were
intensified by the pervasive impact of rote education. Researchers often
consider the process of cognitive radicalization to be less important to
understand or address compared to causes for violent behavior. But
here, once the youth were cognitively engaged and recruited, steps
towards violence were prosaic. The team learned through clinical
interviews that most of the youths recruited by TTP were initially
assigned menial tasks. Once recruits were observed to be loyal to the
relevant commander, they were considered for further training. Those
deemed to be of low cognitive ability were generally assigned to suicide
bombing training as a one-off contribution to the group’s mission,
whereas those considered to have higher cognitive abilities were used
for longer-term goals. These youths were given physical and weapons
training to prepare them for higher status militant missions.30
In summary, our analysis of the process of radicalization is that it was
not strongly motivated by perceived political grievance. Rather,
perceived rewards of belonging, mission, and status inherent in TTP
recruitment provided an alternative to the structural push, pull and
personal factors limiting their lives. The youths were already tilted
towards black and white thinking through the pull of their socialization
and its intensification through rote education. This accorded with the
binary logic of TTP ideology, which the youths were unable to question.
In the words of the Sabaoon team: “These youths were not dangerous
in themselves, but they could be made to do dangerous things.”31

Psychological Concepts that Structure the Intervention
Sabaoon commissioned the intervention using the IC thinking method
(explained below), funded by the Netherlands Government in 2018. We
next explain how the youths’ black and white, low complex thinking
provided an entrée for the intervention’s engine of change, which is the
leveraging of more complex and critical thinking. This is explained
through the psychological concepts below.
Cognitive Complexity
The IC thinking method draws on the concept of cognitive complexity,
measured by integrative complexity (IC). Integrative complexity
concerns one’s ability to differentiate and integrate multiple
perspectives or dimensions on an issue.32 Decades of IC research by
Peter Suedfeld and colleagues demonstrate that IC is a reliable

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1943

23

Peracha et al.: Promoting Cognitive Complexity

psychological predictor of violence in intergroup conflict. Recent
research shows that the ideologies of extremist and violent extremist
groups also show low IC.33 Low IC indicates a propensity for binary,
black and white thinking that precludes acknowledging validity of
different viewpoints, thus preventing collaborative conflict resolution.
Low IC is evident across a range of extremist discourses (Islamist,
sectarian/territorial, white supremacist, and animal rights), and violent
extremists demonstrate statistically lower complexity than nonviolent
but ideologically similar counterparts.34 Analyses of archived
communications of political and military decision-makers involved in
conflicts, such as the American Civil War, World War 1, World War 2,
Cuban Missile Crisis, and Gulf War 1, show that a significant drop in
decision makers’ IC predicts intensified conflict and violence in
subsequent real world events.35
Conversely, increases in complexity of thinking typically result in
nonviolent strategies for conflict resolution.36 Higher IC can render
individuals or groups more amenable to mutual understanding, which
can predict more peaceful outcomes to conflict. In line with the
research on IC, the target of an IC intervention is not participants’
beliefs per se, but rather the how of thinking: The black and white,
binary, categorical, mono-causal, single perspectives on which violent
extremist ideologies are built. As argued above, this binary structure
can be appealing to individuals whose ability to engage with complexity
is constricted due to the push, pull, personal, and rote educational
stressors in their lives.
Because IC analysis concerns a person’s structure of argument rather
than substantive content such as attitudes or beliefs, proponents argue
it is less prone to demand characteristics or social desirability. This can
help to address a concern amongst CVE intervention practitioners
about faked compliance. With IC scoring, a small amount of impression
management is possible, but this is easily identified by experienced
coders, and once identified, is excluded from results.
Meta-awareness
Meta-awareness involves changing one’s focus of attention, a skill that
can reduce negative reactance. Reactance is a defensive cognitive
response marshalled when a person detects that they are being
persuaded to change their thinking. Ironically, in response to
deradicalization efforts, people can often double down on their thinking
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and become even more extreme as they defend their thinking against
change.37 The Sabaoon team earlier had observed that rational
arguments to counter TTP ideology were often not accepted by
inductees. They also found that suggesting new counter narratives to
replace violent extremist narratives had only fleeting impact. In fact,
those with higher cognitive abilities marshalled even stronger
reactance, and were more adept at screening out new information, than
those with lower cognitive abilities. Reactance is likely to be a factor in
the lack of empirical evidence for deradicalization efforts that rely
mainly on logical thinking and correct information in a range of
countries.38
We designed learning activities to enable participants to shift
attentional awareness, or to shift perspectives, within themselves - a
process referred to as decentering or meta-awareness.39 Metaawareness involves stepping back and shifting attention to sensory
perception in the present tense, to gain some safe psychological
distance from the power of negative black and white judgements or
emotions. This stepping back allows one to reflect on how one’s way of
thinking is a malleable process over time, influenced by multiple
factors such as current bodily state, emotions, sensory perception, and
how many elements are currently being considered. The process
supports the management of emotions concerning hot topics of group
identity, inter-group conflicts and loyalties to an extreme group or
ideology.
In short, a key skill developed in the IC intervention is meta-awareness,
a form of metacognition that enables a person to ‘see one’s thinking’
and reflect up on it over time.40 With the help of meta-awareness, low
complex, black and white thinking can be incrementally shifted
towards higher levels of awareness and more complex thinking,
without provoking threat. Integrative complexity interventions enable
alternative perspectives to be perceived without a defensive collapse
back into black and white thinking. This process leads to an ability to
see through the manipulative strategies of any extreme ideology.41
Perspective Taking
One of the most common approaches to increasing cognitive
complexity in intergroup conflict interventions is to promote
perspective taking, which, to some degree involves empathy. Previous
studies have found that empathy when used to help reduce violent
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extremism can have mixed results, particularly as extremists often
exploit emotional concern and identify fusion with a selected group,
which is then used to legitimize aggression against other groups.42
Cognitive empathy, which is motivated to understand another’s way of
thinking, seems safer to leverage in this context. We created group
roleplays that avoid threat to group identity by using randomly
assigned subgroups, to avoid exacerbating threat concerning who has
power and who does not regarding an intergroup conflict.43
Course Structure
To recap, the course themes above arising from push, pull, and
personal factors are structured by cognitive complexity, metaawareness and perspective taking. The intervention’s eight sessions
each has a four step pattern designed to promote cognitive complexity
and perspective taking, as follows:
•
•

•
•

Step A) playful exploration of social dilemmas using cultural
themes described above;
Step B) increase in tension and polarization to provoke low
complexity responses in group activities, followed by metaawareness prompts;
Step C) exploration of emotions and value ranges
underpinning conflicts to promote differentiation; and
Step D) integration, reframing and resolve.44

To enable emotion management in Steps A and B, meta-awareness
prompts are used. As previously mentioned, meta-awareness shifts
awareness to present experience involving thinking, feeling, and
sensing.45 The resulting increased psychological distance can help
people to disidentify from their thought content and inner experience,
thus reducing the impact of negative emotions at key points in the
sessions.46 This helps to make negative internal experience, often
concerning the other, easier to tolerate.47 Towards the end of the
course, meta-awareness is also used to foster awareness of the
rhetorical strategies used in speech and media that are intended to
polarize or radicalize, and to observe one’s own emotional responses to
these messages. In each session, direct reference to Swat or Pakistan
specific extremism was intentionally avoided in designing the course, to
minimize reactance to allow participants to build and practice cognitive
and emotional skills with more distant (but parallel) narratives. 48
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To scaffold cognitive differentiation (the ability to perceive some
validity in shades of grey, multiple dimensions, or differing
perspectives) in Step C, we identified a set of culturally appropriate
value tensions relevant to the cultural themes above. These are taken
from a range of human value universals backed by empirical research.49
We selected the following value tensions:
(a) Mercy/benevolence vs Obedience/punishment,
(b) Individualism vs Tribe/Family
(c) Individual Achievement vs Conformity to social group norms
and roles, and
(d) Justice for all vs. Power/security for the ingroup.
Values research has shown that perceived threat to a group’s own
values can shift people towards a defensive single value (for example,
favoring power, security, and traditional roles at the complete expense
of openness, universalism, and individual achievement). In doing so,
thinking becomes more one sided and less complex. This lack of
complexity inclines thinking towards more extreme positions.
However, enabling participants to perceive at least some validity in
more than one of their own or others’ important values promotes more
complex thinking.50 In Step C, values spectrums are created using signs
placed on the floor at opposite ends of the room, and enacted spatially
by walking along the values spectrum to experience and identify value
tensions, personal tradeoffs, and shades of grey.51
In Step D in each session, role played resolutions to social tensions and
dilemmas occur through randomized small groups.52 Participants end
up role playing randomly assigned and varying sides of a conflict within
a session. This makes it harder to place all blame on the outgroup or to
dehumanize them. Step D provides the opportunity to reappraise the
social tension and examples of extreme rhetoric in more adaptive ways,
a reframing process that is associated with better health and mental
health outcomes as well as better intergroup attitudes.53 As participants
become aware of the malleability of one’s own and others’ cognitive
perspectives, a willingness to come to the table to resolve conflicts
through negotiation and problem solving increases.54 By giving
participants practical skills in maximizing a range of their own values
while respecting the values of others, they are able rehumanize the
other, and opt for a range of prosocial ways to resolve conflict rather
than resort to violence. Throughout, course activities address and
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resolve identification with one’s own group as the only way of
protecting against uncertainty.55
Hypotheses
Based on the prior results showing significant IC gain in 80 out of 80
similarly structured IC courses in nine different cultural contexts, two
main hypotheses concerning IC are proposed.56 One, following the IC
intervention, participants will demonstrate higher IC scores in written
responses to open ended prompts regarding participants’ self-identified
ingroup/s and outgroup/s. Two, following the IC intervention,
participants’ oral presentations will show IC scores indicating
differentiation (IC scores 2, 3 and above) at the end of the course.
As trends using perspective taking and empathy measures are not
consistent across other IC courses, hypotheses regarding perspective
taking and empathy are exploratory. Exploratory hypotheses are as
follows. One, following the intervention, participants will demonstrate
higher self-report scores in perspective taking and empathy measures.
Two, following the intervention participants will demonstrate expected
changes in self-report scores on a Violent Extremism Belief Scale
concerning attitudes relevant to violent extremism.

Method
Participants
At the time of the study, the Sabaoon intake totaled 74 males. Course
participants were selected from the 74 according to the following
criteria:
•

•
•

Middle scores between a percentile rank between the 5th to
75th percentile on the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM)
test. (As mentioned previously, SPM is a non-verbal, culturefree test of reasoning abilities that affords internationally
comparable score ranges).57 Selecting the middle SPM
scorers avoids the extreme differences between high and low
SPM scorers in Pakistan which could skew results.
Age range (13-26 years).
Availability and willingness of the youth to participate in the
intervention.
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Based on the above selection criteria, 64 Sabaoon youths completed the
16-hour IC intervention in three cohorts:
1. 13 currently detained for TTP militancy (CVE Detained cohort),
20.3 percent;
2. 38 formerly detained militants undergoing reintegration (CVE
Reintegrated cohort), 59.4 percent;
3. 13 at risk students (PVE At risk cohort), 20.3 percent. Mean age
is 19.77 years (SD = 3.26, age range is from 13-22 years of age).
All participants are male.
Piloting and facilitator training
The authors collaborated through in person work weeks in the United
Kingdom and in Pakistan to develop the draft content. Eight sessions
(16 contact hours) of group activity were designed drawing on the
themes, psychological concepts, and value tensions, described above.
When the session materials were complete, the director and senior
management of Sabaoon approved the course content and assessment
protocol. These were then translated into Urdu. Facilitator Guides for
group activities, media rich PowerPoints, handouts and homework
assignments were created.
A second visit to Pakistan provided IC facilitator training to the
Sabaoon team. We filmed an inhouse pilot course which was used to
refine course content based on challenges encountered. Next, the
senior Sabaoon team trained thirteen potential local facilitators (from
the Mental Health Team staff working at Sabaoon and Monitoring
Center along with social workers) over two weeks of immersive
training. Six were shortlisted to become facilitators of the IC course.
The six trained facilitators conducted a second pilot course with
Sabaoon teaching staff to test the materials and prepare for possible
challenges that some participants may pose, whether disruptive,
withdrawn, argumentative, and so forth. All sessions were videotaped
so that the facilitators could identify and address any problems. A third
pilot was tested on a Punjab group of male secondary school students.
Of the many schools contacted only one school for boys showed
comparable demographics to the target population at Sabaoon, yielding
a sample of 74 males (ages 13 to 17 years). These participants were
similarly given the SPM reasoning test. A sample of 16 boys was
selected to participate in the intervention based on SPM scores
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matching the prospective Swat sample, excluding the extreme
differences between high or low SPM scorers (according to the
internationally comparable score ranges) to avoid skewing results.
Course Delivery
The same procedure with SPM was carried out in advance of course
delivery to Sabaoon participants. The eight-session intervention was
entitled “Hum Aur Hamara IC” (Urdu for ‘Us and Our IC’) was then
delivered to the CVE Detained, CVE Reintegrated, and PVE At-risk
cohorts, starting with a pre-testing session. Participants completed pretest measures before the beginning of the course and post-test
measures after the final session. For Pashto-speaking participants for
whom written Urdu is difficult, written responses were given orally and
transcribed verbatim by a facilitator. In pairs, two trained facilitators,
each with around 10-15 participants, delivered the course (16 contact
hours) over three to four weeks to the three cohorts at Sabaoon.

Measures
Integrative Complexity
Integrative complexity (IC), a measure of cognitive complexity, is
scored on a scale from 1 to 7, using standard coding procedures.58 A
score of 1 represents the most simple cognitive structures (for example
“our group is completely right”), a score of 2 represents emerging
complexity (for example “sometimes what the other group says makes a
bit of sense”), and a score of 3 represents fully differentiated cognitive
structures that acknowledge the validity of different perspectives (for
example “our main concern is equality between the groups because it is
so important for human dignity, whereas they are concerned with
overall economic prosperity, which of course is needed too”). Scores of
4-7 represent higher level integrations and more advanced complexity
of cognitive structures, for example, “everyone needs to have enough to
live on so both are important. But these are in a tug of war; maybe we
can find a middle position that at least minimally serves both needs.”
Participants’ written verbal data for IC scoring was elicited using a
Paragraph Completion Test (PCT). Paragraph Completion Tests are
widely used to assess conceptual complexity's integrative component.59
PCT using IC scoring shows satisfactory test-retest reliability and
convergent validity using cognitive and personality variables, according
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to previous research.60 As a measure of structure of thinking and
argument, rather than content, IC is difficult to fake. When participants
are speaking or writing, their attention is focused on mental content,
not its underlying structure, making the measure less susceptible to
demand characteristics.
The PCT asks the participants first to write down the group or
community with which they identify and then to write down the
group/s that are different or opposite to their group. These are chosen
from a list of group identity options relevant to northern Pakistan.
Participants are instructed to select any they feel apply, or to come up
with their own. Participants are next prompted to write paragraphs in a
free-flowing way in response to two open-ended prompts:
1. “When I think about my group” and
2. “When I think about the other group”.
Participants wrote eight coded paragraphs (four paragraphs in the
pretest, and four in the post test).
Three trained Urdu speaking IC coders reviewed and coded all
paragraphs (512 total, with no missing data). Participants’ mean IC
score was 1.28 at baseline (pretest), which is comparable to other IC
scores using PCT data. Coders achieved perfect agreement on 85
percent of scores, and scores that differed between the coders were
moderated through discussion. A 30 percent sample of PCT paragraphs
covering the range of scores across pre and posttest was translated into
English and coded independently by an English-speaking IC coder,
achieving perfect agreement with the Urdu speaking coders.
Participants’ oral presentations were given to the whole group at the
end of the course, and were scored for IC. This task allowed
participants to prepare in advance their responses to two prompts,
“What did you experience during the course?” and “How did the course
effect your thinking?” Oral data from Pashto presentations were
translated into Urdu, and an Urdu speaker translated the presentations
into English. Urdu and English-speaking coders coded the entirety of
the videotaped oral presentations. The three coders achieved perfect
agreement on 84 percent of cases and full agreement on the remaining
scores through discussion.
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Perspective Taking and Empathy
Perspective taking was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index, which has good validity and reliability cross-culturally.61 Two
subscales were used: Perspective taking and Emotional empathy.
Participants responded by giving their ratings on a five-point Likert
scale. Empathy was further measured using the Basic Empathy Scale.
Two subscales were used: Affective empathy (emotional congruence
with another person’s emotions), and Cognitive empathy (ability to
understand another person’s emotions).62 Participants responded by
giving their ratings on a five-point Likert scale.
Violent Extremist Belief Scale
The Violent Extremist Belief Scale (VEBS) was administered at the end
of pre and post testing. This scale was developed to measure factors
that arise in the CVE literature, to provide guidelines for interviewing
skills. Factors are: Religious power relating to extremism and religious
legitimation of violence; Power politics relating to the desire to attain
power through politics; Lack of positive thinking concerning religious
harmony and tolerance towards humanity; and Risk taking and
impulsive behavior.63 Participants responded by giving their ratings on
a five-point Likert scale.

Results
Cognitive Complexity Measured by IC Using a Paragraph Completion
Test
Results from paired samples t-tests show statistically significant
increases in cognitive complexity overall, and for each cohort, CVE
Detained, CVE Reintegrated, and PVE At risk. Effect size overall and
for each cohort is very large. The PVE At risk cohort shows the largest
increase in IC (a gain of 1.21), with the CVE Reintegrated cohort second
(0.63). The CVE Detained cohort shows the smallest yet still significant
IC gain (0.31). Please see Table 1. Pre and Post-test Mean IC Scores
from Paragraph Completion Test, below.
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Table 1. Pre and Post-test Mean IC Scores from Paragraph Completion Test
Variable

Pre test
M

SD

Post test
M

SD

t (df)

p

95% CI
LL

UL

Cohen’s d

Overall
Sample
IC score
1.28
.31
1.96
.78
-7.16 (63)
.000*
-.87
-.49
-1.80
N=64
PVE
At risk
IC score
1.21
.27
2.42
1.03
-3.86 (12)
.002*
-1.90
-.53
-2.22
cohort
N=13
CVE
Detained
IC score
1.19
.21
1.50
.49
-2.79 (12)
.016*
-.55
-.07
-1.61
cohort
N=13
CVE
Reintegra
IC score
1.33
.19
1.96
.86
-6.337 (37)
.000*
-.83
-.43
-2.08
ted cohort
N=38
Note. CI = Confidence Interval, LL= Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit. Asterix (*) point out IC mean differences that showed
significant gain.

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1943

33

Peracha et al.: Promoting Cognitive Complexity

Overall, gain in IC is highly significant regarding participants’ selfidentified Ingroup (t=-3.37, p>001) with a large effect size. Gain in IC
is highly significant regarding participants’ self-identified Outgroup/s
(t=-7.12, p<0.000) with a large effect size. See Tables 3 and 4 in the
Appendix A and B for additional details.
Oral Presentations
Individual presentations were given at the end of the course to the
whole group. Mean IC score for the overall sample was 2.67. The CVE
Reintegrated cohort shows the highest mean IC score (2.87), CVE
Detained mean score is 2.54, and PVE At risk mean score is 2.23.
Please see Table 2. IC Scores for the Sample, below.
Table 2. IC Scores for the Sample
Group
N
Overall
64
PVE At risk
13
CVE Detained
13
CVE Reintegrated
38

M (SD)
2.67 (1.01)
2.23 (.60)
2.54 (.66)
2.87 (1.28)

min.-max.
1-6
1-3
2-4
1-6

Perspective Taking, Empathy, and Violent Extremist Beliefs
The subscales used from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the
Basic Empathy Scale each showed non-significant results. See Table 3
in Appendix A.64 Two VEBS subscales showed expected decreases in
the post test: Lack of positive/moderate thinking about humanity and
religious harmony (t = -2.19; p <0.03) and Risk taking/ Impulsive
behavior (t= 2.01, p<0.04). The two other scales, religious power,
violence, and extremism (t = -0.68; p<0.50) and Power politics, desire
to attain power through politics (t = 1.84; p<0.07) were not significant.
There was no overall VEBS significance (t = -1.32; p< 0.19). See Table 4
in Appendix B.

Discussion
Integrative complexity scores
The main hypothesis is supported by significant increases in IC scores
in posttest written responses to open ended PCT prompts. There are
significant increases for the overall sample and for each cohort. Before
the IC intervention, participants’ written responses about their Ingroup
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and Outgroup were mainly structured simply, dichotomously, and in
black and white, categorical terms. After the intervention, their written
responses show more complex, qualified evaluations of the both
Ingroup and Outgroup as having both some good and bad qualities.
They show acknowledgement of at least some validity in different or
opposing viewpoints, and acknowledge some shared values.
Participants’ written responses show awareness of multiple causes of
grievances, multiple factors involved, and an awareness of how their
own thinking has changed over time. This increase in complex thinking
is slightly stronger in paragraphs written about participants’ designated
Outgroup compared to Ingroup, across all three cohorts. It is
encouraging to see that despite participants’ low reasoning scores and
rote educational background the overall gain in IC is consonant with
the gain in IC found with similar courses designed and delivered in far
less challenging contexts. These less challenging contexts include PVE
courses for high schools, community organizations, or for youth
deemed at risk in a community setting.65
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Detained cohort
Before the IC intervention, participants still detained for violent
extremist activities showed dichotomous, unidimensional, unqualified
positive evaluations of their Ingroup/s, and unqualified negative
evaluations concerning their designated Outgroup/s. In social
psychological research, one of the main determinants of negative
attitudes and prejudice towards outgroups is perceived threat posed to
the ingroup.66 In response to perceived threat, a negative view can be
intensified by extremist ideology to the point of derogating and
dehumanizing outgroups. As the all-good ingroup is pitted against the
all-bad outgroup, as analysis of extremist ideology reveals, this is
associated with legitimation and acceptance of aggression and violence
towards the outgroup. It is particularly extreme when the outgroup
comes to be viewed as less than fully human and thus not deserving of
humane treatment.67
After participating in the IC course, the cognitive structure
concerning participants’ self-identified Ingroup/s and Outgroup/s
shift. The CVE Detained cohort’s cognitive complexity towards the
Outgroup increased significantly, indicating that the designated
Outgroup/s are no longer seen in wholly negative terms. Instead,
there is an implicit acceptance of some validity in the Outgroup’s
viewpoints and values. This increase in IC signifies a lessening of

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1943

35

Peracha et al.: Promoting Cognitive Complexity

adherence to extremist ideology that legitimates violence against
Outgroups. Interestingly, there was a trivial decrease in IC
regarding CVE’s Detained cohort’s Ingroup. This non-significant,
slight decrease may indicate that CVE Detained cohort’s energy and
attention was taken up in reframing the Outgroup, or it may point to
having more positive perceptions of a more broadly defined
Ingroup, explained more fully below.
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Reintegrated Cohort
The CVE Reintegrated cohort, like the CVE Detained, previously
were captured by the Pakistan Army for involvement in violent
extremist activities. The Reintegrated are now in a monitored
process of reintegration. Generally, they have a longer experience of
the Sabaoon program and Monitoring Centre than the other two
cohorts, and their results seem to illustrate a Sabaoon effect: A
slightly higher pre-test IC mean across both Ingroup and Outgroup,
and more even-handed gain in IC regarding both Ingroup and the
Outgroup. These results suggest that the IC course had a
particularly broad impact for the reintegrated cohort. The post test
scores also confirms that the criteria for Sabaoon team decisions
about readiness for reintegration were valid and robust. Given that
human behavior is generally motivated according to one’s
perception of the social world, negotiated means of addressing
conflict only becomes possible once these perceptions open in
complexity, as they did in this study.
Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) At Risk Cohort
The PVE At risk cohort had not been involved in prior violent extremist
activities, although they had been identified as at risk by authorities,
often due to family members’ support or involvement in violent
extremism. Preventing Violent Extremism cohort’s IC gains are higher
compared to CVE Detained and Reintegrated cohorts. This suggests
there is perhaps a steeper climb to emerge from black and white
thinking for those who have engaged in the potentially traumatizing
effect of violent activity and being captured. The PVE At risk cohort
show the highest gain in IC regarding the Outgroup, a score that is
higher in comparison with written data from most other IC courses
delivered in less challenging contexts.68 Unfortunately, due to the
sensitive nature of this research, direct participant quotes are not
provided.
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Oral Presentations and IC Scores
Oral presentations prepared in advance by everyone was given to the
whole group at the end of the course. Overall scores show that implicit
differentiation (IC score 2) has been reached by nearly all, and explicit
differentiation (score 3) has been reached by around half of the 64
participants. Nine participants (mainly CVE Reintegrated) showed IC
scores 4, 5 and 6.
Analysis of the video films made clear that it was difficult, particularly
for the CVE Detained and PVE At risk participants, to reveal their
thinking in the group context. The social space in Swat is closely
governed by social norms, and there is immense pressure to conform.
Despite this challenge, all participants’ oral presentations showed they
achieved the ability to see some validity in differing perspectives (with
an overall mean score of 2.67). The CVE Reintegrated cohort were the
stars here, showing unusually strong IC scores through their oral
presentations. Nearly half (45 percent) of Reintegrated cohort’s oral
presentations show elaborated argument structures understanding
both sides of a conflict (at IC score 3). Nine Reintegrated participants
achieved IC scores of 4, 5 and 6. These scores show integration, the
ability to see higher order links between several different views, values,
causes, and outcomes, making sense of how reasonable people can view
the situation so differently. Integrative complexity scores of 5 and 6
show multileveled complexity, which is expected to be found in the
balanced judgements of supreme court judges. These are high IC scores
compared to oral presentations in other IC courses. These high scores
may reflect their longer exposure to the Sabaoon program and
Monitoring Centre which may have encouraged their confidence to
share the breadth of their thinking to the wider group. They are
remarkable findings given these participants’ status as former militants
with prior low reasoning scores and limited, rote education which
predisposes the search for a single right answer.69
As well, participants’ personal experiences of nutritional deprivation,
mental health and head trauma issues provide ample reasons for a
critical thinking intervention to fail. By using the IC method employing
the A, B, C, D steps with meta-awareness while engaging sensory,
embodied, practical, and emotional learning styles concerning cultural
themes relevant to life experiences, participants were able to overcome
some of these personal challenges. CVE Reintegrated participants’ oral

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1943

37

Peracha et al.: Promoting Cognitive Complexity

presentations particularly displayed an increased sense of
empowerment. In their oral presentations, they often expressed a
desire: To use these thinking skills for pro-social conflict resolution as
they return to their communities. As one Reintegrated participant said
(transliterated for reasons of sensitivity), “I never heard of this before. I
did not know about this kind of thinking. I never did this before. But I
can do this. And I can bring this to my community to help them solve
problems.”
Perspective Taking and Empathy Subscales
The non-significant results from the self-report perspective taking and
empathy subscales may suggest participant fatigue. These scales were
administered after the PCT which was two times longer than usual. For
this study, we were concerned that it might be difficult for Sabaoon
participants to write freely in the PCTs, so we devised the PCT to
require a total of eight paragraphs. This doubled the normal length of
the PCT in comparison to other IC courses. In retrospect, we think the
participants were flagging after the PCTs, which may have affected
these results. Nevertheless, the post-test PCT paragraphs do show
many examples of implicit and explicit perspective taking coded at IC
scores 2 and 3, particularly concerning designated Outgroups. Doing so
depends upon the ability to see some validity in others’ perspectives.
Violent Extremist Belief Scale
Two of the four VEBS subscales showed the expected decrease in Lack
of positive/moderate thinking concerning inter-religious harmony and
Risk taking/ impulsive behavior. These changes appear to reflect the
impact of conflict resolving course activities that require some trust and
willingness to engage with the other, and an ability to manage emotions
and reactions while doing so. The other two scales showed did not show
significant change. However, a slight, non-significant increase among
the Reintegrated cohort in Power Politics items was surprising and
invited further scrutiny.
The VEBS scores and PCT verbal data taken together made good sense
given that the Swati youths had not been motivated by political or
religious ideology when they were recruited by TTP. 70 At that point, the
youths had scant (if any) political identification with Pakistan as a
nation. They had little prior understanding of Islam, having only read
the Qur’an in Arabic (if at all), rendering the claims of the extremist
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narrative believable. At Sabaoon, holistic and remedial education
delivered both civics education and moderate religious instruction. For
many youths, this was the first time they made a meaningful
connection with their own nationality and religion. We think this shift
to reframing their religion and Pakistan nationality in a more inclusive
and positive light occurred during the rehabilitation program at
Sabaoon, prior to the IC sessions. The IC intervention reinforced this
new perspective, evidenced in increased positive identification with
national and religious elements of Ingroup identity in the post test
written data.
It is also interesting that participants’ posttest written data show a
broader, more inclusive framing of their Ingroup, for example, beyond
their local region, or beyond their version of Islam, and in some cases,
inclusive of other religions. As above, the posttest PCTs do show a
significant increase in IC scores concerning their Outgroup, a shift
predictive of reduction in violent intergroup conflict and increased
social harmony. Thus, it seems that participants’ slightly increased
scores on these two VEBS scales does not indicate future support for
violent extremism itself, but rather increased identification with a more
positive and inclusive religion and polity, assuaging of one of the
radicalization factors explained earlier.71 As the two other VEBS
scales decreased as expected, there was no overall result indicating
support for violent extremism.

Applying Lessons to Other CVE Interventions
The results of this study touch on questions raised by other CVE efforts.
What does IC method and measurement add to other CVE efforts?
Meta-analyses of CVE initiatives in a range of countries show that it is
difficult to establish the efficacy of deradicalization interventions that
rely mainly on instilling logical arguments and correct information. We
argue this is due in part to such interventions provoking reactance
(cognitive resistance to making changes in thinking).72 As IC is
arguably held at a less than conscious level, IC method and
measurement may address the potential for extremists to respond with
either a reactant, doubling down response, or to give a fake, socially
desirable response.73 IC measurement, as part of an array of regionally
specific measurement tools, could improve measurement for other
deradicalization interventions.
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Secondly, what does the IC intervention add to a holistic, multidisciplinary program like Sabaoon? Sabaoon already encompasses
most of the successful features found in the Saudi, Malaysian and
Indonesian deradicalization models. Sabaoon’s distinctives include
individually tailored, extensive clinical assessments and psychosocial
interventions for individuals, families and groups which informs a
flexible program for each inductee. Inductees can be resident in the
Sabaoon program from 6 months to five years, with an average
duration of two to three years. Sabaoon provides mainstream education
with remedial and accelerated education to cater to the range of slow
learners and high achievers. The more academically inclined are
supported to go on to higher education after rehabilitation. Vocational
training for the less academically inclined is geared towards working in
the local economy. Sports serve a therapeutic purpose and are provided
for all. Religious instruction is provided to address misuse of Qur’anic
verses taken out of context, encourage verification of Qur’anic texts,
and to augment often limited religious understanding through an
approach that emphasizes humanism, tolerance, and harmony between
all faiths. Each Sabaoon graduate receives ongoing support from the
Monitoring Centre as they reintegrate into their villages and pursue
chosen life goals. These features combine to produce Sabaoon’s
extremely low rate of recidivism (0.4 percent), mentioned above, over
12 years since its founding in 2009.74
In answer to the question concerning what an IC intervention adds to
an already successful program such as Sabaoon’s, the first point is that
the intervention followed on from Sabaoon’s provision of practical
support and funding for youths’ chosen education or employment
goals. Sabaoon’s record of accomplishment of low recidivism does
imply that at least some targeted mitigation of structural push factors
such as education and employment is needed for successful
deradicalization and reintegration. However, it seems a false dichotomy
to expect mitigations to structural factors on their own to be sufficient
if graduates also lack the cognitive ability to navigate the pull factors of
their social context. The IC method was commissioned so that the
youths would become cognitively resourced to emerge from black and
white thinking, navigate their social world going forward, avoid
derailing their goal direction in the face of unchanged push, pull and
personal factors, as well as to become resilient to the lure of belonging,
status, and reward promised by extremist groups generally.
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Timing is important to consider. The Sabaoon team consider that
introducing some initial IC course sessions for selected individuals at
approximately at a one-year juncture from the start of detention could
help to hasten the resolving of binary cognitive structures to promote
deradicalization. The team reports that at the time of induction at
Sabaoon, the youths’ ability to think logically is limited. Inductees may
feel traumatized, fearful, or confused. After one year at Sabaoon,
inductees’ reasoning abilities improve, measured by the SPM
assessment. This improvement at one year on seems to be a result of
individually tailored psychosocial interventions, which in turn
produces a readiness for the IC intervention.
The second point at which an IC intervention may be beneficial for
other CVE programs is after the deradicalization process has been
successfully achieved, to ensure that participants’ structure of thinking
has in fact emerged from black and white thinking, before commencing
reintegration. As mentioned above, the CVE Reintegrated participants’
post test IC scores confirmed that the criteria for reintegration taken by
the Sabaoon team had in fact been valid. A hard to fake measurement
like IC, tailored to an intervention designed to increase IC, could be a
helpful, discriminating tool to be used along with other locally
validated measures for other deradicalization programs.
A third point for implementing additional IC sessions is soon after
reintegration, when it is natural that these individuals will encounter
differing perspectives, daily tensions, complex social issues, and the
pull of social norms. In this article, the oral presentations of the CVE
Reintegrated youth showed a surprising prowess in achieving high
levels of differentiation and integration in their thinking. It seems that
these increases in IC turbocharged the impact of the Sabaoon program.
Their oral presentations demonstrated their skills of thinking flexibly
and critically for themselves, seeing through manipulative
communications, generating alternative perspectives, charting realistic
trajectories, addressing issues related to stigma, and reforming bonds
at the family and community level.

Limitations and Challenges
Could factors other than the IC thinking course be responsible for these
results? This cannot be answered by this study as it was not feasible to
have a control group. The reasons for this are as follows. Given that the

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1943

41

Peracha et al.: Promoting Cognitive Complexity

entire current Sabaoon population was selected for the intervention, it
was not feasible to recruit and gain consent from other populations
matched on important variables such as demographics and SPM scores,
given the scope and timescale of the funded project. However, control
group comparisons matched on these variables are now available in
other projects. A follow-on project to this study has been completed for
a large sample of Pakistan secondary school students (n = 687, mean
age 14.8 years of age) with a control/intervention design.75 This IC
critical thinking course was delivered in secondary schools in
vulnerable regions in Swat Valley and in Punjab. Here, the control and
intervention groups were matched on age, gender, educational
attainment, and SPM scores. These results show significant gain in IC
for the intervention group, and virtually no gain in IC for the control
group. Additionally, an IC critical thinking course designed for
secondary schools in the United Kingdom (n = 199, mean age 14.7)
shows significantly higher IC gains for the intervention group
compared to the control group.76 Both sets of control/intervention
results indicate that IC gain was due to the IC intervention, and not to
other influences.
It would have been preferable for the IC coding to be carried out by
coders completely independent from Sabaoon psychologists and
developers of the course. However, this study was carried out in highrisk security context. As such, it was necessary that the analysis of raw
verbal data was carried out by the appointed Sabaoon team of
psychologists.
Lastly, the greatest challenge to this project was the pervasive impact of
rote education on how participants think. Adaptations of the IC
method are needed for each context, and in this study, a great deal of
effort was spent in addressing the impact of rote education and low
reasoning abilities by creating sequences of small steps to enable a
transition from concrete, right/wrong thinking, and to assuage the fear
of being wrong, to support participants to think more independently,
flexibly, and critically. When something did not work out in piloting as
planned, it was often traced back to having missed out some of these
small steps to address the constraints arising from rote education.
Next Steps
In addition to the IC critical thinking course delivered to Pakistan
secondary schools mentioned above, a short version of that IC critical

42
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 1

thinking course has been delivered online in Pakistan, with promising
results. In response to the COVID era, we have developed online
methods of training facilitators, monitoring courses, scalable IC related
measurement, with significant results. We are currently delivering
advanced IC critical thinking courses in universities in northern
Pakistan and Punjab, leveraging topics in history and political science
to increase cognitive complexity and critical thinking. In short, we hope
to take all that we are learning to inform a range of scalable IC courses
and teacher training for primary, secondary, tertiary, and adult
education.
An urgent question remains. Can the gains reported in this study be
maintained over time, or in the face of challenges such as the current
Taliban takeover of neighboring Afghanistan and resurgence of other
extremist groups such as ISIS-K? To answer this question, a
longitudinal study two years following this study has been undertaken
with Sabaoon reintegrated graduates by one of the authors, Raafia
Raees Khan (forthcoming), showing that IC gains are maintained up to
a two year interval, in accordance with independently observed
participant behavior change reported in studies of other IC
interventions.77

Conclusion
To our knowledge, the study presented here is the first assessment of
an empirically based intervention delivered to young males who were
involved in fighting for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Swati
youths who had been apprehended by the Pakistan Army, and
subsequently participated in this study, were lacking in family
supervision and many had dropped out of school. Without much hope
for finding employment in the under-developed northern Pakistan
region, subjected to the prevailing tight communalism and rote
education which habituated them to black and white, right/wrong
thinking, these young men lacked basic critical thinking abilities. They
were unable to see through the false promises of the militants. These
low IC youths were fortunately stopped in their tracks. Sabaoon was,
for these young males, the first light of dawn.
The IC intervention results show the expected gain in cognitive
complexity measured by IC comparing pre to post test, consonant with
increased critical thinking and reframed self-identifications concerning
Outgroup/s and Ingroup. Course content capturing participants’
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everyday social tensions allowed the young men to explore their
thinking as it is entwined with emotions, to step back, get some
distance, reduce a sense of threat, and use a greater range of values and
thinking skills to find new solutions to intra and intergroup tensions
exploited by extremism, and to see through the lures to extremism.
Despite some initial positive economic development taking place in the
KP region, many hard structural factors remain. As mentioned above,
push factors need to be addressed at the structural level. Equally
important is the need to seed a virtuous cycle based on cognitive skills
to reduce the black and white thinking that heightens vulnerability to
extremist ideology. In sum, we think the addition of the IC course to
the Sabaoon program helped to accelerate deradicalization and support
rehabilitation. It is our aim to introduce this method for other
deradicalization centers and prison populations.
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Appendix A
Table 3. IC Scores for Ingroup (PCT)
Pre-test
Variable
Ingroup
Overall
Sample
Ingroup
PVE group
Ingroup
CVE group
Ingroup
RI group

M

SD

Post-test
M

95% CI

SD

t

p

LL

UL

Cohen’s d

IC gain

1.31

.40

1.63

.71

-3.37

.001*

-.50

-.13

-0.84

IC gain

1.27

.39

1.73

.83

-1.85

.09

-1.00

.08

-1.06

IC gain

1.31

.43

1.23

.33

.62

.55

-.19

.35

0.35

IC gain

1.33

.41

1.72

.73

-3.30

.002*

-.64

-.15

-1.08

Note. CI = Confidence Interval, LL= Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit. Asterix (*) point out IC mean differences that showed
significant gain.
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Appendix B
Table 4. IC Scores for Outgroup (PCT)
Variable
Outgroup
Overall Sample
Outgroup
PVE group
Outgroup CVE
group
Outgroup
RI group

IC
IC
IC
IC

Pre-test
M

SD

Post-test
M

SD

t

p

95% CI
LL

UL

Cohen’s d

1.25

.41

2.30

1.15

-7.12

.000*

-1.35

-.76

-1.79

1.15

.24

3.12

1.52

-4.29

.001*

-2.96

-.96

-2.47

1.08

.19

1.77

.86

-2.84

.015*

-1.22

-.16

-1.63

1.33

.48

2.20

.96

-5.68

.000*

-1.17

-.56

-1.86

Note. CI = Confidence Interval, LL= Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit. Asterix (*) point out IC mean differences that showed
significant gain.
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Appendix C
Table 5. Perspective Taking and Empathy Questionnaire Scores
Variable

Pre-test

Post-test

M
SD
M
SD
Perspective Taking 19.07
3.26
19.37
3.25
Affective Empathy
39.59
5.37
38.88
5.72
Cognitive Empathy 34.69
4.20
33.77
3.73
Note. CI = Confidence Interval, LL= Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit.
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t (59)
-.52
.99
1.41

p
.60
.33
.16

95% CI
LL
-1.45
-.73
-.39

UL
.85
2.15
2.25

Cohen’s d
.07
-.13
-.19
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Appendix D
Table 6. Violent Extremism Belief Scores (VEBS)
Variable

Pre-test
M
51.89

SD
24.77

Post-test
M
56.60

SD
7.75

t (54)

p

95% CI
LL
-11.88

UL
2.46

Cohen’s d

VEBS total
-1.32
.19
.18
Religious power
.09
violence and
22.25
13.42
23.50
5.39
-0.68
.50
-4.90
2.40
extremism
Lack of positive
.32
12.36
4.31
13.78
1.80
-2.19
.03*
-2.73
-.12
thinking
Power politics
10.48
5.64
9.00
3.77
1.84
.07
-.12
3.09
-.25
Risk taking and
9.13
2.86
8.19
2.57
2.01
.04*
.04
1.83
-.31
impulsive behavior
Note. CI = Confidence Interval, LL= Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit. Asterix (*) point out IC mean differences that showed
significant gain.
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